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Abstract 
With environmental regimes, rapidly emerging and developing, scholars working on the 
evaluation of ecosystem governance and its capacity to adapt to global environmental 
change, face a challenge of accounting for the past changes of institutional set-ups and 
“legacy effects” they created. These effects may include previously taken management 
actions (including infrastructure development) and formal and informal institutions 
developed or modified. This is important that even if completely new governance 
regimes are being emerged/introduced, the inertia of the previous set-up can be 
persistent, in particular where informal institutions are strong. 
 
This problem has been raised in the course of a larger study looking at the adaptive 
capacity of forest ecosystems in Belarus. Belarus makes for an interesting case because 
the country is in socio-economic transition since early 1990s, and it still preserves the 
national governance, which is very much top-down and not participatory. At the same 
time, the national government and NG sector closely cooperate with international 
organisations and EU on a number of initiatives, Belarus has ratified most of 
environmental MEAs, and the national environmental legislation has often been 
developed after EU models, i.e. multiple levels of environmental governance emerge 
and influence the national policy and the implementation mechanisms. Another effect of 
transition is that the conservation status of many protected areas and mandates of the 
management agencies are often revised and re-formulated. 
 
To account for the legacy effect on the adaptation capacity of institutions of ecosystem 
governance, we have developed a methodological framework based on the analytical 
problems of the Earth System Governance as formulated by Biermann et al (2009) 
(Architecture, Agents, Allocation, Accountability, Adaptiveness) translated in a set of 
operational criteria. The criteria were applied to typical institutional set-ups associated 
with certain conservations categories of forest ecosystems, and mapped nationwide. 
 
Topics: Indicators, assessments and monitoring 
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Introduction 
Socioeconomic transition, political and administrative reforms can radically change a 
familiar landscape of governance: new actors come to the scene, but also new formal 
and informal institutions emerge, while older ones also remain important or often provide 
a layout for the new arrangements to develop; this effect is also known as “institutional 
stickiness” (Joung 2002). When it comes to ecosystem (e.g. forest) governance, the past 
institutional set-ups manifest mostly in established links between local 
communities/governments and conservation bodies, behavioural patterns of local people 
and, often, also in management practices (or malpractices). If the conservation site in 
question is of the national and international importance, the established arrangements 
from higher hierarchical levels become important, and national and international NGOs, 
national government, academia, politicians and broader public take their time to get used 
to the new reality. This institutional inertia is often conceptualised as a “legacy effect” 
(e.g. Liu et al. 2007), and apparently it has an obvious effect on the governance 
landscape, and needs to be accounted for in evaluations of governance performance, 
adaptation etc. While this issue has broader implications, in this paper we focus on the 
two more specific questions, which are central to any evaluation methodology: 
 
1) What aspects of past institutional arrangements matter (are sticky)? 
2) For how long do they matter (how sticky they are)? 
 
Apparently, these questions would get different answers across different scales and 
institutional contexts, however as a way to outline an evaluation methodology and to 
explore tools and methods of … governance theory, we have run a “legacy effect” scan 
for forest governance at a nation’s level.  
 
In this study we are also trying to put institutional set-ups in spatially-explicit contexts, 
i.e. we appreciate the importance of their geographical locations and intend to account 
for the spatial interdependencies. Most important, this gives a grasp about relationships 
between natural and social processes, and also about spatial behaviour of social 
constructs; viewing institutional set-ups against the specific biogeophysical settings also 
helps to approach problems of scale and fit. The closest reference to this approach is 
“landscape governance” that is also primarily concerned with the spatial reference of 
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governance (Görg 2007, p. 954). The value of spatially explicit information for ecosystem 
management was recognised a long time ago, and although policy scientists had also 
identified a number of spatially relevant issues (e.g. ‘local trap’ (Brown and Purcell 
2005)) and the spatially bound configuration of institutional set-ups became evident 
already a few decades ago (e.g. by (Clark 1987)), the issues of mapping and spatial 
analysis of environmental governance have not been systematically discussed in 
scholarly literature as yet. In this paper we seek to address this through a systematic 
search for spatially-relevant (i.e. geographically attributable) criteria of governance 
performance, which we tried to put on a map and analyse as geographical phenomena. 
 
The study was done for forests in Belarus, where the socio-economic transition took a 
rather unusual configuration: the country never showed any interest in the EU 
integration, and the governance is very top-down (even more so than in Russia or 
Ukraine), although the multiple layers also emerge, especially in environmental 
governance, which is supported by many MEAs ratified by Belarus, and by programs of 
international cooperation and assistance. The national systems of forestry and 
biodiversity management feature an impressive diversity of management and 
conservation mandates, which are usually executed by a few responsible bodies. This 
gives a vast space to all kinds of overlaps and interplays, however at the nation’s level 
the overall performance of the system is rather good, and short of other reasonable 
explanations, this also can be attributed to robust institutional practices survived the 
transition, i.e. to the said legacy effects. In this way Belarus also can be viewed as a sort 
of alternative scenario for CEE EU members, while the analysis of institutional set-ups 
functioning across the scales can help to understand many failures of biodiversity 
governance not only in these countries, but also in older EU members.  
 
Understanding of institutional set-ups 
Governmental bodies are the only important actors in the biodiversity governance of 
forest ecosystems in Belarus; the extent the governmental structures are ready to 
consider the local circumstances and cooperate with other stakeholders, directly 
depends on the conservation status of forest patches (i.e. the conservation mandate and 
the managing authorities). The managing bodies have different agendas, available 
resources, administration styles and ways to interact with broader public and NGOs, and 
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Figure 1: Main groups of management bodies in Belarus 
 
Figure 2: All the management bodies accounted 
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also possess very different power and legitimacy, and therefore the conservation status 
of a forest patch may also indicate the way formal and informal institutions of biodiversity 
governance work. An evaluation of the institutional set-ups associated with the forest 
patches gives a way for a spatially-explicit attribution of biodiversity governance, at least 
if the modes of institutional interactions are firmly bound to a certain conservation status, 
as demonstrated for Belarus. 
 
Having realised the importance of architecture, accountability, allocation of resources, 
agency and adaptiveness for the systems analysed, we have developed an matrix 
looking at these five problems as formulated in the research plan of Earth System 
Governance project (ESG) (Biermann et al 2009). In our analytical framework each of 
these problems is analysed from the perspectives of fit, interplay and scale as 
summarised in the Table 1. 
 
The “Architecture” is what the fit-interplay-scale problem is basically all about; it is a 
fundamental component of the evaluation, as all other evaluation components are to a 
great extent explained by it. Notions of “fit” in the domain of “architecture” open up great 
perspectives for spatially explicit analysis and also give an opportunity to link the 
performance of ecosystem management and the institutional context; closely related 
problems of “interplay” and “scale” are very much about the evolving the local 
institutional regimes into higher level architectures, and also about their interference with 
large institutional frames. 
 
“Agency” accounts for the inclusiveness of the governance system. We agree that the 
governance should be multilevel, so the multiple centers of governance are included into 
institutional frames. However, we also recognize the danger of taking the idea of 
“polycentric governance” into the extreme; that makes the whole governance action (in 
pursing the institutional frames) disintegrated, uncoordinated and less effective. 
 
“Accountability” is explicitly coupled with the issues of inclusiveness and closely relates 
to the “Allocation” that also builds on the “architecture”. It is very well discussed in the 
body of literature on environmental justice; together with the “accountability” it relates to 
another well discussed issue of legitimacy. 
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Table 1: Analysis of past institutional arrangements – spatially relevant criteria 
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“Adaptation” is about resources available, and also about the learning capacity and 
knowledge accumulated and readily available in the institutional set-up. In this sense it 
makes a clear reference to the inclusiveness, and the learning capacity and experience 
of multiple actors, which can be involved to the governance or excluded. In situations 
where formal institutions are missing (or inflexible), the informal arrangements often play 




Evaluation of institutional set-ups 
Storylines developed for each evaluation band have been based on the evidence 
obtained from semi-structured interviews conducted in 2008-10 with representatives of 
all the relevant stakeholder groups involved into forestry governance in Belarus, from 
published and unpublished reports and studies, pieces of national and local legislation, 
management plans and programs, internet discussions etc.  
 
Table 2 shows how the evaluation approach described in Table 1 have been 
operationalised, and Table 3 gives examples of score distribution between the major 
groups of forest management bodies.  
 
Table 2: An overview of the evaluation criteria applied to institutional set-ups 
Score Architecture Agency beyond the state 
Adaptive 
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Table 3 shows scores’ estimations for the main groups of management bodies  
Types of institutional regimes (Jan 1, 2008) 
Evaluation criteria 
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X 
Architecture 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 
Agents 1 3 3 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 
Adaptiveness 2 2 3 3 3 1 2 2 2 3 
Accountability 2 2 3 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 
Allocation/access 2 2 3 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 
I - national parks (managed by the Presidential Management Department)  
II - national reserves (Ministries of Forestry and Environment) 
III - local reserves (local authorities and the Ministry of Forestry under the monitoring of the 
Ministry of Environment) 
IV - Paleski Reserve (the Ministry of Emergencies) 
V - forestry units (the Ministry of Forestry) 
VI - military grounds (the Ministry of Defence) 
VII - game grounds (the Presidential Management Department) 
VIII - forestry units of educational institutions (the Ministry of Education) 
IX - research forestry stations (the National Science Academy of Belarus) 
X - park forestry units (local authorities) 
 
 
Accounting for past governance regimes 
The evaluation also takes into account the changes that occurred over the last decade, 
keeping in mind that the past governance set-ups have an inertia, which is likely to have 
a positive or a negative effect on institutions and institutional arrangements existing in 
the area, and also means that a certain level of infrastructure was or will be developed. 
To account for this, the final evaluation score (IA) is calculated as a sum of the 
evaluation of a current governance set up (AI) and the change of the score occurred 
during the decade (∆AI):  
 
IA = AI+∆AI 
 
Figure 3 shows changes in institutional set-ups during the last decade associated with 
re-formulation of forestry management mandates, administrative reforms etc, and 
Figure 4 shows final evaluation scores accounting for the legacy effect. 
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Figure 3: Directions of changes in institutional set-ups during 1998-2008 
 
 
Figure 4: Evaluation of institutional set-ups associated with forest management 
mandates and their changes during 1998-2008 
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Conclusions 
Governance frames do not make cause a significant legacy effect, while governance 
regimes (Paavola et al. 2009) are quite sticky. 
Sources of governance regime legacies: 
• Significant legacy effects are associated with the fact that it takes time for agents 
to redefine who they are and what their interests are. 
• Shortage of resources to implement institutional changes. 
• Sympathetic officials in key governmental agencies. 
 
Literature 
Biermann F (2007) ‘Earth system governance’ as a crosscutting theme of global change 
research. Global Environmental Change 17: 326-337 
 
Biermann, F., Betsill, M.M., Gupta, J., Kanie, N., Lebel, L., Liverman, D., Schroeder, H., 
Siebenhüner, B. (2009) Earth System Governance: People, Places and the Planet. 
Science and Implementation Plan of the Earth System Governance Project. ESG Report 
1. Bonn, IHDP: The Earth System Governance Project. 
 
Clark, W.C. (1987) Scale relationships in the interactions of climate, ecosystems, and 
societies. In: K.C. Land and S.H. Schneider, (Eds.) Forecasting in the social and natural 
sciences. Reidel, Dordrecht, The Netherlands: 337-378 
 
Görg, C. (2007) Landscape governance. The 'politics of scale' and the 'natural' 
conditions of places. Geoforum 38: 954–966. 
 
IPCC (2007). Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution 
of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 976 pp 
 
Liu, J. Dietz, T., Carpenter, S.R., Alberti, M., Folke, C., Moran, E., Pell, A.N., Deadman, 
P., Kratz, T., Lubchenco, J., Ostrom, E., Ouyang, Z., Provencher, W., Redman, C.L,, 
Schneider, S.H,, Taylor, W.W. (2007) Complexity of Coupled Human and Natural 
Systems. Science 317: 1513-1516. 
 
Brown, J.C. and Purcell, M. (2005) There's nothing inherent about scale: political 
ecology, the local trap, and the politics of development in the Brazilian Amazon. 
Geoforum 36(5): 607-624. 
 
Ostrom, E. (2007) A diagnostic approach for going beyond panaceas. Proceedings of 
the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 104(39): 15181-
15187. 
 
Anton Shkaruba, Viktar Kireyeu 
Berlin Conference on the Human Dimensions of Global Environmental Change 2010 
Ostrom, E. (2008) Developing a method for analyzing institutional change. In: Batie, S., 
Mercuro, N. (Eds.), Assessing the Evolution and Impact of Alternative Institutional 
Structures. Routledge Press, London. 
 
Young, O.R. (2002) Matching Institutions and Ecosystems: The Problem of Fit. Institut 
du Developpement Durable et des Relations Internationales (IDDRI). 
 
Young, O. (1999) Institutional dimensions of global environmental change. Science plan. 
IHDP Report No. 9, IHDP, Bonn. 
 
Young, O. (2002) The Institutional Dimensions of Environmental Change: Fit, Interplay 
and Change. MIT Press: Cambridge, MA. 
 
Paavola, J., Gouldson, A., Kluvánková-Oravská, T. (2009) Interplay of Actors, Scales, 
Frameworks and Regimes in the Governance of Biodiversity. Environmental Policy and 
Governance 19(3): 148–158. 
